Abstract. Due to the externalities, in normal form games a deviation changes the payoff of all players inducing a retaliation by the remaining or residual players. The stability of an outcome depends on the expectations potential deviators have about this reaction, but so far no satisfactory theory has been provided. The present paper continues the work of Tulkens and Chander (1997) where deviators consider residual equilibria, but we allow coalitions to form, moreover introduce consistency between the residual solution and the solution of the original game. Optimistic and pessimistic considerations produce a pair of cores. These cores are compared to some existing cooperative concepts such as the γ-and r-cores and the equilibrium binding agreements. In our final section we discuss the predominance of the grand coalition and suggest a generalisation of the normal form where such a precedence can be removed.
Introduction
The core is one of the simplest and most intuitive solution concepts. Originally defined for characteristic function form games it collects those imputations for the grand coalition where none of the coalitions profit from deviating and getting its value given by the characteristic function. The characteristic function form was defined by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) from the normal form using the minimax rule. This definition has been updated by many and the recent years when externalities begun to draw a special interest brought up a number of new conversion rules. The purpose of this paper is not to add one more to the line, but to apply the core directly to normal form games.
Normal form games contain widespread externalities. A deviation changes not only the deviators', but also everyone else's payoffs. While the noncooperative literature, such as Ichiishi (1981) in its social coalitional equilibrium often overlooks potential reactions referring to simultaneity, in cooperative games, where agreements are made collectively and a deviation cannot go unnoticed. The remaining players or residuals react to avoid damage or to exploit new opportunities. Such a reaction calls for a secondary reaction and so forth. The question is: will this chain-reaction stop or converge to some final outcome, in particular how can the initial deviators predict their terminal payoff.
Much of the existing literature still follows von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) to consider deviators equipped with excessive pessimism or optimism. They expect the residuals to hurt/help them as much as possible while this may not be in their best interests. Harsányi (1963) introduced a model where deviators and residuals (cooperatively) bargain with each other and so the interests of the latter are also represented. Here residuals act as one coalition. In the model of Chander and Tulkens (1994) and Tulkens and Chander (1997) the residuals play individually rational strategies, that is, a Nash equilibrium is reached against the deviating players, but here the residuals act independently. In this paper we continue and generalise these works by allowing residual players to form (intermediate) coalition structures and thus pursue group-wise rational strategies as well.
More recently Ray and Vohra (1997) defined the set of the coarsest equilibrium binding agreements and Huang and Sjöström (2001) the r-core. The set of equilibrium binding agreements is a farsighted concept, where only credible, refining deviations are permitted. The r-core is more general than that; its limitation is only that it solves games via a -though sophisticated-characteristic function that is seldom defined. Non-trivial games exist with non-empty cores where the r-core is undefined.
The concept we define allows for arbitrary deviations and includes some limited farsighted flavour while being a fundamentally myopic concept. Its strength is that it gives the same rational behaviour to residual as to deviators. In our last section we discuss some limitations the game form poses on the concept and propose a more general game form.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next part contains some fundamental definitions. Section 3 presents some criticisms of the existing theories as a motivation for the introduction of a new concept. The fourth section contains the actual definitions and some comparisons with other concepts on the market. Section 5 closes with the ambitious plan to generalise the normal game form allowing for games where the grand coalition has a more limited power and where our cores (after small modifications) can return some -mathematically-much more diverse results.
Preliminaries
2.1. Normal form games. Let N be the set of players. Subsets of N are called coalitions. A partition P of N is a breaking up of N into disjoint coalitions. Π(S) is the set of partitions of S. Let also X i denote the strategy set for player i and u i : i∈N X i → R be a payoff function for player i. We call Γ = N, (X i , u i ) i∈N a game in normal form or simply a game.
For any coalition S ⊆ N let X S denote j∈S X j and X −S denote j∈N \S X j . We will also use X to denote X N . For any x ≡ (x i ) i∈N ∈ X and S ⊆ N we use x S to denote (x j ) j∈S and if N \ S is nonempty x −S to denote (x j ) j∈N \S . Also, for x ∈ X and S ⊆ N we denote i∈S u i (x) by u S (x). We will economise our notation by writing the element instead of a singleton set, such as i instead of {i} or R instead of {R}, in particular −i stands for N \ {i}.
The game is a hybrid game in the sense of Zhao (1992) and is played in two stages. First players form coalitions, in the second stage these coalitions, regarded as superplayers play noncooperatively against each other. This paper focuses mainly on the first, cooperative part of the game where we assume that cooperation within coalitions also includes transfers between players of the coalition. The concept we introduce can be extended to the more general NTU case as well.
For a given partition P the transfers can be described by a transfer scheme (t i ) i∈N where t i ∈ R for all i and we restrict transfers to coalitions by requiring j∈S t j = 0 for all S ∈ P. The actual payment player i receives is its profit π i , defined by π i (x, t, P) = u i (x) + t i .
A player's profit will in general be different from its payoff, although it is clear that for coalitions we must have u S (x) = π S , where π S = i∈S π i . We will always assume that this property holds. A player's aim is to maximise its profit π i .
Finally we define outcomes. An outcome gives a complete description of the state of the game: the partition of the players, the strategies they choose and the transfers that occur within each of the coalitions. We will write it as a triple consisting of a profit and a strategy vector and the partition of the players as a = (π, x, P).
2.2.
Characteristic function form games. In characteristic function form games players do not make their own decisions nor receive individual payoffs. Their freedom is limited to joining a coalition (the singleton coalition consisting of itself included). Then the coalition is assigned a payoff independently of the formation of other coalitions. This payoff is given by the characteristic function.
Definition 2.1 (Characteristic function). The characteristic function assigns a real number to each coalition:
A game in the characteristic function form is a pair (N, v) . In the following we give the definition of the core and the coalition structure core. Imputations are profit vectors that satisfy π i ≥ v(i) (individual rationality) and x = v(N ) (efficiency).
An imputation π is dominated via coalition S if v(S) > π S . Members of the dominating coalition S benefit from forming S and leaving the grand coalition, which is often regarded as the socially desirable outcome (especially if superadditivity is assumed). Imputation π is dominated if it is dominated via some coalition S ⊆ N . The core collects undominated imputations.
In characteristic function games an outcome is a pair (π, P) that satisfies π i ≥ v(i) (individual rationality) and π S = v(S) for all S ∈ P combining feasibility and efficiency. Outcomes generalise imputations as the formation of the grand coalition is not presumed.
An outcome (π, P) is dominated via coalition S if v(S) > π S . Observe that S / ∈ P. The outcome (π, P) is dominated if it is dominated via some coalition S ⊆ N . The coalition structure core collects the undominated outcomes (Greenberg 1994) .
3. Solving the game 3.1. Noncooperative stage. First we consider the second stage of the game, where coalition structure P has already formed. To solve this stage we use the best-response property Ray and Vohra (1997) have introduced, essentially a generalisation of the Nash-equilibrium for coalitions that act as players.
Definition 3.1 (Best response property). The strategy vector x ∈ X satisfies the best response property relative to P if for each coalition S ∈ P and x S ∈ X S we have u S (x S , x −S ) ≤ u S (x). Let β(P) denote the set of best response strategy profiles.
The existence of such equilibria is well known under certain conditions that mostly hold.
Cooperative stage.
Knowing what coalition formation yields we solve the first, cooperative stage. We look for a core-like concept collecting undominated outcomes. For this we need to know what a coalition can expect by deviating. Normal form games are more complex than characteristic form games in two ways: We may have multiple bestresponse strategy profiles in the second stage even for a given partition, and secondly a deviation is followed by a retaliation by the residuals due to the widespread externalities present. This retaliation may then prompt secondary and even further reactions.
Unlike Ray and Vohra (1997) we consider myopic players. How can deviators predict the end outcome, in particular, their terminal payoff? The mathematically appealing simplest approach is conservatism: indeed the characteristic function of a coalition has originally been defined by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) by the minimax representation as v(S) = min
Thus deviating players are assuming the worst: A coalition deviates only if in all cases, with all possible reactions it will be better off. However "all cases" may very unrealistic ones, too. Using the words of Ray and Vohra, why should we expect that residual players act in such a bloodthirsty fashion as to hurt deviators to the maximum extent? Excessive pessimism, or, for that matter, excessive optimism can be very misleading and are subject to significant improvements.
3.3. The γ−core. Tulkens and Chander (1997) took a major step in refining these approaches. Their key idea is that non-equilibrium residual strategy-profiles are subject to further deviations, and hence will necessarily be abandoned. Therefore should the chain of reactions stop it cannot stop at such instable outcomes. Therefore the deviating players should only consider residual equilibria as possible reactions. Chander and Tulkens (1994) picked Nash equilibria, or in their terminology, individually rational behaviour. Definition 3.2 (Dominance with individually rational residual reaction). An outcome a = (π, x, P) is dominated via coalition S if in the partition P S consisting of S and singletons there exists a strategy vector x ∈ X that satisfies
If a is dominated via coalition S, then there exists a profit vector π ∈ R N such that π S = u S (x ) and π i ≥ π i for all i ∈ S moreover there exists a player i ∈ S such that π i > π i . Then we can say that outcome b = (π , x , P S ) dominates a via S.
This definition then enables us to define a characteristic function and the core of the corresponding characteristic function form game, broadly known as the γ−core (Tulkens and Chander 1997) .
Note the hidden optimism in this definition: the coalition is willing to abandon a if there exists a better outcome b even though the formation of b is not guaranteed: a different, less advantageous Nash equilibrium may equally likely occur. While in this model deviators are more realistic about the residual reaction, they presume that no other coalitions form. In the following concept we relax this assumption.
4. The core of a normal form game 4.1. Need for a more general solution. A new concept should satisfy the following:
• Domination/deviation is for once and all without renegotiation.
• Following Chander and Tulkens (1994) only look at residual equilibrium outcomes.
• Consistency of global and residual equilibrium concepts.
• Solution in the original form. In addition to these we have to bear in mind a number of further points.
4.1.1. Multi-coalitional deviations. Most existing concepts exclude the possibility that more then one coalition deviates at the same time. In games without externalities multi-coalition deviations reproduce as a sequence of single-coalition deviations and as long as "undominance" is concerned a deviation by a set of coalitions or by only one of them makes no difference.
As we introduce externalities this feature vanishes. The appendix shows a 4-player game where for the partitions P 0 = {1, 2, 3, 4}, P 1 = {{1, 2} , 3, 4}, P 2 = {1, 2, {3, 4}} and P 3 = {{1, 2} , {3, 4}} have both unique Nash equilibria giving respectively 2, 4, 4 and 6 to each coalition. While P 3 Pareto-dominates P 3 it cannot be attained via a sequence of profitable deviations as the formation of {1, 2} or {3, 4} is not profitable, moreover at the same time the remaining players (still singletons) enjoy 4 each, so for them forming the other pair is disadvantageous. In this paper we require Pareto domination to imply domination, and for this reason we permit multi-coalition deviations.
Residual behaviour.
Much of the criticism of existing solutions stems from the incorrect, simplistic expectations about the behaviour of the residual players. A theory can only be satisfactory if it treats deviating and residual players equally. In the proposed model deviations induce residual subgames of a more limited strategy space. We solve this game we use same concept as for the large game resulting a recursive definition.
Our first definition is of a residual game. The residual game is a function of the deviators' strategies, but does not depend on their partition, which only influences the transfers they can make among themselves.
where R is the residual set, s ∈ X N \R is the strategy of the deviating coalitions, and u s i is the residual payoff function that we define as follows for all x ∈ X R .
The residual game is a normal form game like the initial game, with a trivial, but crucial difference that |R| < |N |. This enables us to define the core in a recursive way. 4.1.3. Behavioural assumptions. Deviating players consider a set of residual equilibria that have different implications on their payoffs. Without introducing further considerations, such as efficiency or a preference for a certain coalition structure we cannot make a selection of these equilibria. We use optimism and pessimism on the side of the deviating players to consider the extreme cases, but here the core shows a reduced sensitivity to behavioural assumptions.
4.2. Definitions. The definitions are inductive and are done in four steps each. For a trivial single-player game we can give the core explicitly. Given the definition for all at most k − 1 player games we can give our definition of dominance for k player games. Once dominance is defined, we may define the core. First we give the definition for the pessimistic case, and then a slightly modified version comes for the optimistic core. Step 1. The core of a trivial game. Let N, (X i , u i ) i∈N be a game. The core of a game Γ 1 with N = {1} is given by the payoff-dominant strategy of this single player:
Step 2. Inductive assumption.
We assume that the core has been defined for all games with at most k − 1 players. Now we give the definition for a game with k players.
Step 3. Dominance Consider the outcome (π, x, P) and a deviation s ∈ X S by S ⊆ N and the corresponding residual game Γ s over the residual set R. The outcome (π, x, P) is dominated via S ∈ Π(S) if there exists a strategy vector s ∈ X S such that in the corresponding residual game Γ s over the residual set R either:
(1) the residual core C − (Γ s ) is empty and for all strategy profiles r ∈ X R ∩ β(R) for some R ∈ Π(R) we have u T (s, r) > π T for all T ∈ S, or (2) the residual core C − (Γ s ) is not empty and for all (π , r, Q) ∈ C − (Γ s ) we have that r satisfies u T (s, r) > π T for all T ∈ S. An outcome (π, x, P) is dominated if it is dominated via a set of coalitions.
Step 4. Core The core of a game of k players is the set of undominated outcomes and we denote it by
Definition 4.3 (Core -optimistic case). The definition consists of four steps:
Step 1. The core of a trivial game. Let N, (X i , u i ) i∈N be a game. The core of a game Γ 1 with N = {1} is given by the payoff-dominant strategy of this single player:
Step 2. Inductive assumption. We assume that the core has been defined for all games with at most k − 1 players. Now we give the definition for a game with k players.
(1) the residual core C − (Γ s ) is empty and there exists a strategy profile r ∈ X R ∩ β(R) for some R ∈ Π(R) such that u T (s, r) > π T for all T ∈ S, or (2) the residual core C − (Γ s ) is not empty and there exists an outcome (π , r,
An outcome (π, x, P) is dominated if it is dominated via a set of coalitions.
4.3. Interpretation. The induction relies on two simple facts: the obvious definition for a trivial one-person game, and on the aforementioned reduction of residual games. To test whether a given outcome is in the core we must test it against deviations by all possible combinations of disjoint coalitions and for all of their strategies. A deviation is successful if it represents an improvement and deviating players deviate expecting rational residual behaviour. Two cases are considered: a non-empty residual core implies a non-transient residual outcome. Moreover for normal form games the nonemptiness of the core implies that the grand coalition can form where all claims are satisfied, that is, in contrast to characteristic function games the core outcomes represent social optima. Should the core be empty such outcomes do not exist, and based on our theories there is no way to predict which outcomes arise. Therefore we only require that the strategy profile chosen satisfies the best-response property for the coalition structure that formed, but make no restriction on the coalition structure. This is a direct generalisation of the concept of Chander and Tulkens (1994) .
Observe the different attitude in the optimistic and the pessimistic approaches. In the optimistic case a deviation occurs if there is a way to achieve improvement for all deviating coalitions, while in the pessimistic case such an improvement must be guaranteed in all cases.
Features and properties.
Lemma 4.4. Let Γ = N, (X i , u i ) i∈N be a game and let C(Γ) be one of its cores (optimistic or pessimistic). Then if (π, x, P) ∈ C(Γ) such that P = {N }, then (π, x, {N }) ∈ C(Γ).
Proof. First we show that x ∈ β({N }). Should this not hold then the grand coalition would upset the outcome, and play something else. Since the grand coalition has a complete control over the strategy selection it deviates if there exists a strategy profile x ∈ X such that u N (x ) > u N (x). However, should such an x exist the outcome (π, x, P) would be dominated via the grand coalition contradicting (π, x, P) ∈ C. Now given that x ∈ β({N }), the outcome (π, x, {N }) ∈ C is only subject to coalitional deviations. Since (π, x, P) has the same payoff for all players and is immune to all deviations, we get the required result. Now consider an outcome and a coalitional deviation. The residual core -provided nonempty-consists of outcomes with strategies that are optimal under the grand coalition. From the pint of view of externalities, transfers between players do not matter, so we focus on the set of core-strategy profiles. While theoretically it is possible that they all produce the same total payoff for the grand coalition, in applications we will often find either a unique core-strategy vector or strategy vectors with symmetries across players that give the same to the deviating players. Then the expectations and hence the cores under the optimistic and the pessimistic scenarios coincide. Note, however that this property holds only for 'games with nonempty residual cores and only for "most" of these. It requires no proof to see that when we apply a smaller residual strategy set the behavioural assumptions (optimism/pessimism) play a smaller role and as a result our concept, although contains an element of optimism or pessimism, is less sensitive to them. An illustration for this can be found at (Kóczy 2002 ) for a game in the partition function form, a generalisation of the characteristic function form that includes externalities.
Another point we insist on is to take the two cores together, as the upper and lower ends of an interval of sets (for inclusion). This interval is always confined in the interval of classical optimistic and pessimistic cores and is typically narrower. The two cores enable us to make different types of predictions, or to avoid different types of errors. The optimistic core is smaller; if an outcome belongs to this core it is surely in the core. If an outcome is outside the -typically larger-pessimistic core then it is definitely dominated. For the rest these theories do not give a decisive conclusion. 4.5.2. The γ-core. In Section 3.3 we have already discussed the γ-core of Tulkens and Chander (1997) in detail. The core-pair we have introduced extends the notion of γ-core. On the other hand there is no exclusion-inclusion relation between the γ-core and the above core-pair. 4.5.3. Equilibrium binding agreements. Ray and Vohra (1997) defined equilibrium binding agreements (EBA's ) and the concept became instantaneously popular for games with externalities. The EBA's are outcomes with best-response strategy profiles that are also immune to "credible" defections by a subcoalition. While the original definition did not allow transfers here we consider a TU-version to allow a better comparison.
We need some extra notation. For a partition P, let R(P) denote its refinements. The coalitions of a refinementP of P are subsets of coalitions in P. The deviating coalitions inP that enforcedP from P are called perpetrators while the rest are the residuals. As a coalition may break into several, say k subcoalitions, k − 1 of these have to be labelled as perpetrators. A re-merging is a coalition structure formed by the merger of perpetrators with their respective residuals.
Definition 4.5 (Equilibrium binding agreements for a given partition). The definition is recursive. Let B(P) denote the set of EBA's for a given partition P.
1. For the trivial partition, P 0 of singleton coalitions as no further deviations are allowed, B(P 0 ) = β(P 0 ).
2. Now consider partitions P with P 0 as the only possible refinement. For any x ∈ β(P) we say that (u(x 0 ), x 0 , P 0 ) blocks (π, x, P) if x 0 ∈ B(P), and there exists a perpetrator S such that u S (x 0 ) > π S (x).
3. Assume that for some P the set B(P ) has been defined for all P ∈ R(P) and that for each x ∈ β(P ) the all outcomes (π , x , P ) blocking (π , x , P ) have been found. 4. Let x ∈ β(P). Then (π, x, P) is blocked by (π , x , P ) if P ∈ R(P) and there exists a collection of perpetrators and residuals in the move from P to P such that (1) x is a binding agreement for P , (2) x satisfies that x S = u S (x ) for all S in P,
there is a leading perpetrator S, which gains from the move, that is,
any re-merging,P of the other perpetrators is blocked by (π , x , P ) as well, with one of these perpetrators as a leading perpetrator. Formally, let S be the set of perpetrators other than S in the move from P to P . Then B(P) = ∅ and there exists a strategy profilex ∈ β(P), a profit vectorπ and S ∈ S, such that (π,x,P) is blocked by (π , x , P ) with S as the leading perpetrator. 5. A strategy profile a is an equilibrium binding agreement for P if x ∈ β (P) and there is no (π , x , P ) that blocks (π, x, P).
Several different partitions may admit EBA's. Since the grand coalition is taken as the starting point the focus is on the the EBA's with the grand coalition itself, or if such agreements do not exists the EBA's admitted by the coarsest partitions.
In the following we list some similarities and differences between the cores and the EBA's and produce some simple results about their relation.
One notices immediately the otherwise uncommon recursive definition. The leading perpetrators "leave the room" and the negotiations continue with the residuals only, just as in the theory we proposed. However, equilibrium binding agreements are only safe against refining deviations: Ray and Vohra further assumes that "leaving the room" breaks all contacts and further communication is impossible. We allow arbitrary deviations, as we think that the purpose of a deviation is exactly to establish a new alliance where the individuals interests are better respected. This aforementioned limitation is the reason for the arbitrary starting point: the grand coalition, while in our case the bargaining can start anywhere.
EBA's are only safe against credible deviations that are not subject to subsequent deviations. Clearly our concept cannot satisfy such a property. Most outcomes are subject to a deviation via the grand coalition. In particular, when we test the stability of the grand coalition we find that (almost) no deviations are credible as renegotiation is always possible. On the other hand, while we call our concept myopic the stability of the resulting outcome is safe against most possible subsequent deviations, and so stability is concerned our concept contains also some farsighted flavour. Before we discuss this further, note that we do not explicitly determine the post-deviation outcome, but consider a set of outcomes that can form. Recall also that the deviation occurred not to attain certain outcomes, but based on beliefs about what the resulting outcome can be. Therefore the credibility of a deviation does not depend on what the deviating players get in a given post-deviation outcome, but what could it get considering all cases. A post-deviation outcome must be stable against three types of deviations to have credibility.
(1) The deviating coalitions contain both deviating and residual players. If we measure farsightedness against EBA's where such regrouping is not permitted we can exclude this case. (2) The deviating players are all original deviators: This subsequent deviation is also profitable from the starting outcome so this way we replace a non-credible deviation by another profitable deviation. Moreover, if we assume that a deviating set of players always chooses the best deviating partition the new deviation must contain only a subset of players eventually leading to a deviation that is immune to subsequent ones. (3) The deviating players are all residuals. Here we discuss two subcases.
(a) The residual core was empty. Deviating players already expected this instability of the residual game hence the deviation results in no change. (b) The residual core was not empty. A subsequent deviation can only be profitable if the leading deviators change their strategies as well. But since the postdeviation outcome is now taken as the starting point there seems to be no problem with changing roles, and indeed this type would break the credibility of some deviations.
Farsightedness makes stability easier, restricting deviations to refining ones makes it harder to maintain, and so the relation between the cores and the equilibrium binding agreements is somewhat unclear.
In the following we give a simple lemma about the relation of the core and the EBA's. Since EBA's are defined in an optimistic form, we also use the optimistic core for a better comparison.
Lemma 4.6. If all equilibrium binding agreements are inefficient the (optimistic) core of the game is empty.
Proof. Inefficiencies arise if all outcomes (π, x, P) with P = {N } are blocked, where x ∈ β({N }). we show that blocking correspond to deviations. Our proof is by induction.
1. The result is trivial for single-player games. 2. Assume that the lemma holds for all games with at most n − 1 players. 3. Prove the lemma for a game with n-players. If an outcome is blocked, then there exists a perpetrator that gets better off given the EBA's in the residual game.
(1) If the residual core of the corresponding deviation is empty, under the optimistic beliefs the deviating coalition expects at least this much, thus it will also deviate. (2) If the residual core is not empty, by Lemma 4.4 it contains outcomes with strategies supporting the grand coalition, then -using our inductive assumption-the grand coalition is the coarsest residual EBA, hence the perpetrators of the ongoing blocking have the same beliefs as the deviating coalition(s), and so deviation and blocking happens at the same time. We have checked all possibilities, and found that deviations and blockings correspond to each other. Inefficiencies imply blockings for the best response strategies under the grand coalition. By our proof then there are profitable deviations from all core outcomes supporting the grand coalition. But by the same Lemma 4.4 this implies that the core is empty. This proves our lemma.
This result, however, does not imply that the set of the coarsest EBA's would include the core. If the core is not empty, by Lemma 4.6 there exist efficient EBA's that is, there exists an EBA for the grand coalition, too. Thus if the core contains outcomes with different partitions they will not be in the solution of Ray and Vohra. 4.5.4. The r-core. Huang and Sjöström (2001) define the r-theory and among others the r-core. In this parallel work to ours they consider a similar game and depart from a rather similar idea, but on the end their implementation is somewhat different and these differences become magnified as we look at the final product. Their aim is also to introduce consistency in dealing with the residual players, but they keep the characteristic function as an intermediate tool to find a solution. For completeness we present their definition. In order to do this we need to introduce some extra notation.
For any set S ⊆ N let S be a partition of S and let R be its complement.
2 Then let X (S) denote the set of possible strategies given S. The worth of each subcoalition T ⊆ R is denoted by V S (T ).
3
Definition 4.7 (r-core (Huang and Sjöström 2001) ). The definition consists of five steps.
2 Recall that we allow only single-coalition deviations; S is produced by a sequence of deviations in smaller and smaller residual games.
3 Our notation simplifies that of Huang and Sjöström (2001) . In their work V S (T ) is written as
Step 1. Trivial case If |R| = 1 then for any S partition of N \ R,
Step 2. Induction hypothesis Assume that X (S) has been defined for all 1 ≤ |R| ≤ k − 1 and all partitions S of N \ R.
Step 3. Inductive step Consider R, such that |R| = k. Then let
and for any proper subset T R define
The right hand side of the expression is well-defined since R \ T has strictly fewer players and is nonempty.
Step 4. The definition of X (S) Let C(R, V S ) denote the core of the (characteristic function form) game (R, V S ). Then
Step 5. The largest game As the induction continues we reach larger and larger residual games. Huang and Sjöström (2001) consider the extreme case a deviation by a grand coalition at the end as if it happened in a residual game that coincides with the entire game. The above definitions can be reproduced here without a problem bearing in mind that S = ∅. This concludes the definition.
While reducing the game to the characteristic function form saves us from part of the complicity we encountered in our definitions, it becomes a limiting feature in two aspects. Firstly the characteristic function cannot directly give payoffs for multi-coalition deviations; so Huang and Sjöström allows deviators to optimise their partition (Equation 4.5), but this definition seems to allow transfers across deviating coalitions. Overlooking this fact may lead to deviations that are profitable for all deviators in the characteristic function form game but the same deviation in the normal form could even result in a loss for some of the players involved. For this reason we think it is unappropriate to use the characteristic function as an intermediate tool to solve normal form games.
Secondly, Huang and Sjöström insist on consistency to the extent that their characteristic function is only defined if all residual cores are nonempty. As the size of games increase, the number of residual games increase tremendously and so this requirement becomes very demanding. Huang and Sjöström realise this problem and suggest it as a topic for further research. The present paper offers an answer to their proposal, although we realise the weaknesses of the solution offered.
This restriction raises a more fundamental issue that we illustrate with a 4-player game having an empty residual core (Table 1) u 8880 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 D m 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 d 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 Table 1 . A 4-player example with an empty residual core Players 1, 2, 3 and 4 have strategies {l, c, r}, {u, m, d}, {L, C, R} and {U, D} respectively. Payoffs are represented as 4-digit numbers to save space, where the respective digits give the payoff of the individual players, so for instance at (c, d, L, U) we read 4185, therefore player 1 gets 4, player 2 gets 1, player 3 gets 8 and player 4 gets 5. The game is symmetric in the first three players. After an inspection of the payoffs we find that the grand coalition maximizes its payoff by playing (l, u, L, D) , where it collects 24. Consider a deviation by player 4. The residual core is empty. This makes the r-characteristic function and hence the r-core undefined, even though the payoff of player 4 is independent of the residual strategies: 5. Our concepts find coincidental nonempty optimistic and pessimistic cores. An intuitive argument yields the same: All residual reactions satisfying the bestresponse property yield the same payoff for the deviating coalition. Moreover the payoff of a deviating coalition is the same regardless of the coalitions it coordinated its deviation. Hence in this case the characteristic function is well defined and yields the same nonempty core. Put it differently: the above game is a normal-form representation of a characteristic function game with a nonempty core. Yet, the r-core is undefined and hence it is not a generalisation of the core.
5. Superadditivity and the grand coalition 5.1. Criticisms of the grand coalition. We have defined the new core concept for games in the classical and very intuitive normal or strategic form. A strategic form game is defined by a set of players, their possible strategies and a payoff function that describes the proceeds from a given strategy profile, or in other words, what a single play of the game yields. The definition is indeed very intuitive and flexible, we can easily model everyday situations by normal form games.
Problems begin when we allow coalitions to form. What is actually the role of a coalition? Players form coalitions to coordinate their strategy selection and to allow transfers, or compensations should the overall optimal strategy be suboptimal for individual members. Is it realistic to assume that a coalition's strategies are the combinations of its members' strategies? Can it follow all of these strategies, exactly these, and only these? In particular: is it realistic to assume that the grand coalition can do anything its members could, and, moreover, achieve the same payoff its members would? This feature seems to be rather limiting.
The grand coalition is of the starting point and the purpose of the game is often to find a "fair" or "stable" distribution of the payoff of the grand coalition. For some games this idea might work well: "superadditivity is intuitively rather compelling; why should not disjoint coalitions when acting together get at least as much as they can when acting separately?" (Aumann and Dréze 1975, p233) . However there might be situations when there are objective reasons that disallow the formation of the grand coalitions, such as legal objections against monopolies. Aumann and Dréze (1975) , Guesnerie and Oddou (1979) and more recently Carraro and Siniscalco (1988) discuss circumstances where subadditivity occurs and/or the grand coalition does not form. The fact that here we always get the grand coalition (Lemma 4.4) suggest that there is either a problem with the solution applied or the specification of the game.
Also: Zhou (1994) lists 3 conditions that a solution should satisfy. The core already fails, because it can be empty, but this feature has long been accepted as a price for simplicity. Now here, although we started from the coalition structure core, we always produce outcomes with the grand coalition that makes the core fail for the second time. This again suggests that we should look for a change. We believe the improvement should be made at the side of the game and not of the solution.
The purpose of this section is to suggest a generalisation of the normal form that allows other coalition structures to emerge as optimal.
5.2. Generalisation of the normal form. Our generalisation is analogous to the step from games in the characteristic function form to games in partition function form although our motivation is different: The partition function form was defined by Thrall and Lucas (1963) to introduce externalities in coalition formation games. Externalities are already present here, we want to introduce subadditivity that is a matter of course in characteristic function games. In our definition we will essentially define a partition function that in turn defines a payoff function corresponding to a different normal form game for each partition as follows.
Definition 5.1 (Generalised normal form game). Let N be the set of players, P a partition of the players and S ⊆ N a coalition. Then we define a strategic partition function:
where Φ is the set of possible payoff functions.
In this game coalitions have their "own" strategies, such asx S and we tried to reflect it in the notation as well: here the coalitions' strategies are no more products of their members strategies (x S ), but act as players on their own (x S ). At the same time it is very easy to produce the generalised normal form of a normal form game starting from the payoff function for the all-singletons partition P 0 and settingX S (P) = X S (P 0 ) = i∈S X i (P 0 ).
Difficult as it seems the generalised normal form is not at all more complicated than the normal form while it offers the desired generality. It is also clear that the core concepts extend to this form after small changes in the notation and that once the grand coalition becomes less attractive (mathematically) more colourful cores may arise. Table 3 . Payoffs in the noncooperative stage with P 1 = {{1, 2} , {3} , {4}}. Now consider the game where players 1 and 2 formed a coalition and so instead of maximising their individual payoff they maximise their joint payoff. The game is symmetric between 1 and 2 and between 3 and 4. Payoff-identical cases are only listed once. Table 3 gives the coalitional payoffs when partition P 1 = {{1, 2} , {3} , {4}} is formed. In this representation the first coalition chooses matrices, the second chooses columns and the third chooses rows. The unique strategy profile that satisfies the best-response property is marked in boldface. In a similar fashion we can create a table of coalitional payoffs when P 2 = {{1} , {2} , {3, 4}} is formed. The payoffs are presented in Table 4 .
Finally we present the coalitional payoffs when both coalitions have formed, that is, when we have partition P 3 = {{1, 2} , {3, 4}}. In this case the strategies of coalition {1, 2} are {ul, uc=ml, ur=dl, mc, mr=dc, dr}, the strategies for {3, 4} are {UL, UC=ML, UR=DL, MC, MR=DC, DR}. Table 5 contains the coalitional payoffs. This game has again Nash equilibria that are unique up to the coalitional payoffs.
